The poker game is based on skill and strategy, but it’s also a game of deception. The line between bluffing someone who knows the game and taking advantage of someone who doesn’t is sometimes blurry, especially in high-pressure situations. Many players use bluffing to gain an advantage.
This article presents a simple evolutionary game theory model that describes how overconfidence and bluffing coevolve in a structured population. The model shows that when players’ real capabilities are limited, they will use overconfidence and lying to compete for a limited resource. Overconfidence and bluffing are a powerful strategy to collect a limited resource because they help competitors convince rivals that the competitor is more competent than she really is. Overconfidence can also increase the risk of conflict. The model shows that topological features of the network play a critical role in the evolution of overconfidence. In particular, increasing network heterogeneity could boost bluffing, and facilitate punishment for overconfidence.
The results indicate that the evolution of bluffing and overconfidence depends on both the payoff structure in the game and the network size. Large d